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ABSTRACT 
Research Question/Issue: This paper studies the relationship between country-level 
unemployment insurance and cash holdings of privately-held firms. When public 
unemployment insurance is weak, firms may provide alternative unemployment insurance by 
committing not to lay off workers in bad times. We hypothesize that one way firms can do so 
is by holding larger cash balances.  
Research Findings/Insights: Using a large sample covering 388,940 private firms from 32 
countries around the world over the 2007-2014 period, we find a negative relationship between 
public unemployment insurance and cash holdings. This effect is driven by countries where 
public unemployment insurance is weak or non-existent. We also find that privately-held firms 
keep a larger part of their new debt issues as cash when public unemployment insurance is 
weak. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to a growing literature on an institution-
based view of comparative corporate governance. We show that national governance factors 
and, more specifically, public unemployment insurance, which protects employees (an 
important but relatively ignored stakeholder), influences firm cash holdings in a private firm 
context. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our findings have important implications for policy design. 
Specifically, they suggest that labor market institutions designed to support employees can also 
indirectly benefit their employers because these institutions allow firms to reduce the 
opportunity cost related to holding larger cash balances. 
 
Keywords: privately-held firms, cash holdings, unemployment risk, public unemployment 
insurance  
JEL classification codes: G32, G38, J83 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Firms across the world hold considerable amounts of cash (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith & Servaes, 
2003). However, significant cash holdings increase managerial discretion, which raises 
concerns about agency problems (Kalcheva & Lins, 2007). For instance, managers may use 
cash to invest in “pet projects” that benefit themselves but do not create value for shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Moreover, cash holdings are subject to a high opportunity cost 
because they yield low returns (Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz, 1999). Consequently, a 
large literature has emerged to increase our understanding of the firm-, industry- and country-
level factors that explain why firms hold significant cash balances (e.g., Chen, 2008; Dittmar 
& Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith & Servaes, 2003; Frésard & Salva, 2010; Harford, 
Mansi & Maxwell, 2008; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Kusnadi & Wei, 2011; Lins, Servaes & 
Tufano, 2010; Liu, Luo & Tian, 2015; McLean, 2011; Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz, 
1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson, 2003, 2006). However, this 
influential literature is characterized by some remarkable gaps that we address in this study.  
First, while privately-held firms are the dominant organizational form across the world, 
empirical evidence on cash holdings of private firms remains scarce. Still, privately-held firms 
differ from their public counterparts in some fundamental ways (Brav, 2009). For instance, 
privately-held firms generally have lower manager-shareholder agency problems than public 
firms because managers and owners are often the same individuals (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Thus, private firm managers are less likely to overinvest at the expense of the owners, which 
explains why private firms have lower cash balances than public firms (Gao, Harford & Kai, 
2013). However, because private firms are more constrained in accessing external capital 
markets, they have a higher precautionary demand for cash than public firms (Brav, 2009). It 
is further noteworthy that the dearth of research on cash holdings of private firms usually comes 
from single-country studies (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011; Deloof, 2001; Gao, Harford & 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Kai, 2013; García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2008; Martínez-Sola, Garcia-Teruel & Martinez-
Sola, 2018; Orens & Reheul, 2013).1 Importantly, however, one can observe some notable 
differences in the findings across studies.2 Such differences suggest that we need more multi-
country studies on cash holdings of private firms, such as ours, to establish the generalizability 
of findings from prior single-country studies.  
Second, although differences in samples, time frames, and measures could explain some 
of the differences across single-country studies, an institutional economic perspective (North, 
1990) indicates that differences in countries’ national governance systems are also impactful 
(e.g., Cumming, Sapienza & Siegel, 2009; Cumming, Johan & Zhang, 2014). Consistent with 
this idea, extant research has started to examine how differences in countries’ protection of 
stakeholders, including shareholders and creditors, influence firm cash holdings. However, 
insights on other key stakeholders, such as employees, are more limited. More recently, there 
is an emerging literature on the relationship between different dimensions of countries’ labor 
protection institutions and cash holdings (e.g., Cui, John, Pang & Wu, 2018; Devos & Rahman, 
2018; Klasa, Maxwell & Ortiz-Molina, 2009), but this literature focuses on publicly-traded 
firms. Despite this focus on public firms, employees’ concerns about losing their job, which 
would bring them substantial costs (Agrawal & Matsa, 2013) may be particularly acute in 
privately-held firms. Indeed, private firms are regularly viewed as less legitimate employers by 
(prospective) employees relative to public firms (e.g., Vanacker & Forbes, 2016; Williamson, 
2000; Williamson, Cable & Aldrich, 2002). Consequently, we need more insights on how a 
                                                          
1 A notable exception is Hall, Mateus & Bezhentseva Mateus (2014), who focus on a geographically limited set 
of countries, namely Central and Eastern European countries. 
2 For instance, cash holdings are remarkably larger in the Belgian sample (12% of total assets) of Orens & Reheul 
(2013), compared to those in the Spanish sample (6.6% of total assets) of García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano 
(2008). 
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country’s labor protection institutions—particularly those that affect (prospective) employees’ 
perceived risk of unemployment—relate to cash holdings in privately-held firms.  
This paper addresses the abovementioned gaps by focusing on the relationship between 
countries’ public unemployment insurance—a specific labor protection institution that reduces 
the risk of unemployment and the associated loss of wages and other benefits (Ellul, Pagano & 
Schivardi, 2016)—and private firm cash holdings around the world. To do so, we use a large 
sample covering 388,940 private firms from 32 countries over the period 2007-2014. There are 
several possibilities for firms to reduce (prospective) employees’ perceptions of unemployment 
risk, which are expected to be particularly high in countries with weak public unemployment 
insurance. For instance, prior research on public firms focused on ownership structure (Ellul, 
Pagano & Schivardi, 2018) and leverage (Agrawal & Matsa, 2013). However, private firms 
generally have concentrated ownership. Moreover, while private firms could also reduce their 
leverage to minimize unemployment risk, debt is often a very crucial form of external financing 
for these firms (Brav, 2009).3 Consistent with Devos & Rahman (2018), we focus on firm cash 
holdings, which could represent a credible firm-level insurance against employees’ 
unemployment risk. They find that US public firms significantly decreased their cash holdings 
after increases in unemployment insurance benefits in US states between 1982 and 2010. 
Contrary to Devos & Rahman (2018), we investigate cross-country differences in 
unemployment insurance and how this affects private firm cash holdings. 
We hypothesize that privately-held firms hold more cash in countries with weaker 
public unemployment insurance. Greater cash holdings reduce the likelihood that firms must 
fire employees during a period of internal or external turmoil. Accordingly, firms might hold 
more cash as an insurance to diminish (prospective) employees’ perceptions of unemployment 
                                                          
3 When private firms attract new debt, tight financial covenants can also reduce (prospective) employees’ 
perceptions of unemployment risk. However, it represents a double-edged sword because fixed debt-related 
payments also increase bankruptcy risk. 
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risk. Because this risk is particularly acute in countries with low public unemployment 
insurance, precautionary cash holdings are expected to be greater for firms in these countries. 
These extra cash holdings may benefit the firm in two ways. First, employees are willing to 
accept lower wages and benefits if the perceived unemployment risk is lower. Second, a lower 
unemployment risk facilitates the hiring of new employees (Brown & Matsa, 2016; Devos & 
Rahman, 2018). In addition, we hypothesize that the issuance of new debt, which is the main 
source of external finance for privately-held firms (Brav, 2009), results in larger cash balances 
in countries with weaker public unemployment insurance.  
A potential problem with an empirically observed relation between public 
unemployment insurance and firm cash holdings is that this relation might be driven by other 
factors, which are correlated with public unemployment insurance and cash holdings. We 
address this problem in several ways. First, we include in all regressions firm characteristics 
that have been found to significantly affect cash holdings (e.g., Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011; 
Gao, Harford & Kai, 2013; Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz, 1999). Second, we control 
for country characteristics that might be correlated with public unemployment insurance and 
could affect firm cash holdings. These country characteristics measure macro-economic 
conditions, the availability of private credit, legal creditor protection and the rule of law in the 
country where the firm is established. We also include two dimensions of labor protection that 
have been found to significantly affect cash holdings of publicly-traded firms: the degree of 
unionization (Klasa, Maxwell & Ortiz-Molina, 2009) and the degree of legal employment 
protection (Cui, John, Pang & Wu, 2018). Finally, we also include industry fixed effects and, 
where possible, country fixed effects. 
After controlling for the abovementioned factors, we find a statistically and 
economically significant negative relation between public unemployment insurance and 
private firm cash holdings. Thus, privately-held firms hold more cash for unemployment 
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insurance when countries have a weaker public unemployment insurance system. This negative 
relation is driven by countries where public unemployment insurance is weak or non-existent, 
which suggests that the value that firms derive from “insuring” their workers against 
unemployment by holding more cash disappears once a country provides a relatively generous 
public unemployment insurance system. We further find that the relationship between increases 
in leverage and cash holdings is stronger for privately-held firms in countries with weak public 
unemployment insurance, which suggests that in these countries the proceeds of debt issues are 
more likely to be used for unemployment insurance. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we provide 
evidence on the determinants of cash holdings in private firms using a unique worldwide 
sample. This sample allows us to establish the generalizability of findings from a limited set of 
previous single-country studies. Establishing the external validity of prior findings is an 
increasingly important issue in many academic fields (Bettis, Helfat & Shaver, 2016). Second, 
we also make a broader contribution to a growing literature on the institution‐based view of 
comparative corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera, Talaulicar, Chung, Jimenez & Goel, 2015; 
Cumming, Johan & Zhang, 2014; van Essen, Strike, Carney & Sapp, 2015). Specifically, we 
provide first-time evidence on the relationship between government policy with respect to 
unemployment and private firm cash holdings.  
Our findings suggest that labor market institutions designed to protect employees also 
benefit employers, by allowing private firms to reduce their investments in cash. In a recent 
paper, Fuest, Peichl & Siegloch. (2018) show that German firms shift a significant part of the 
cost of corporate tax increases towards their employees by decreasing their wages. 
Investigating the effect of 6,800 corporate tax increases in German municipalities on the wages 
paid by firms located in these municipalities, they find that employees bear about half of the 
total tax burden. We show that firms and employees not only share costs imposed by the 
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government on firms (i.e. corporate taxes) but also share benefits granted by the government 
to employees (i.e. unemployment insurance). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our 
hypotheses. We then discuss the sample and variables in section 3. Regression results are 
discussed in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
2. HYPOTHESES 
Large cash balances provide managers with significant discretion, which represents a double-
edged sword (e.g., George, 2005). On the one hand, cash allows managers to invest in projects 
that destroy value for shareholders but benefit themselves (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Moreover, cash investments have a high opportunity cost because they yield very low returns 
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz, 1999). On the other hand, large cash balances buffer 
firms against internal and external shocks (Duchin, 2010). An institutional economic 
perspective (North, 1990) indicates that differences in countries’ institutions will affect 
managerial behavior. Regulatory institutions, in particular, “establish and enforce laws and 
policies that govern business activities” (Holmes, Miller, Hitt & Salmador, 2003: 544). These 
institutions may provide protection to different firm stakeholders, affect managers’ discretion 
to take specific actions, and thereby influence firm behavior, including its financial policies. 
This idea is well established in the influential law and finance literature (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Extant research has almost exclusively focused on the role of shareholder and creditor 
protection laws on firms’ financial policies, including their cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith & Servaes, 2003; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Kusnadi & Wei, 2011). However, other 
important firm stakeholders, such as employees, have received more limited attention. Still, a 
growing literature is developing on how employees affect firms’ financial policies, including 
their cash holdings (e.g., Cui, John, Pang & Wu, 2018; Devos & Rahman, 2018; Klasa, 
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Maxwell & Ortiz-Molina, 2009).4 Unfortunately, as highlighted before, this literature focuses 
exclusively on publicly-traded firms.  
It is remarkable that so little research has focused on cross-country differences in cash 
holdings of privately-held firms and that we lack evidence altogether on how employees affect 
cash holdings in these firms. Cash holdings may be particularly crucial in private firms because 
these firms lack access to (and are often unwilling to access) external capital markets (Brav, 
2009). While managers in publicly-traded firms can usually smooth their activities and invest 
when appropriate by accessing public markets, managers in privately-held firms have to rely 
more on cash holdings to do so (Brav, 2009). Still, privately-held firms often have fewer 
manager-shareholder agency problems than publicly-traded firms because they typically have 
concentrated ownership. This situation reduces the ability of private firm managers to 
overinvest at the expense of the owners and hence reduces their incentive to keep high cash 
reserves. Consistent with this agency argument, Gao, Harford & Kai (2013) find that public 
firms in the US tend to hold more cash than private firms, despite a higher precautionary 
demand for cash by private firms. 
Employees are also key stakeholders in privately-held firms and these firms are major 
employers in most economies around the world. Importantly, when employees contribute their 
scarce human resources to firms, they face the risk of losing their job, which would bring them 
substantial costs (see Agrawal & Matsa, 2013, and Devos & Rahman, 2018, for an overview 
of the relevant literature). In many countries, employees are insured against layoffs by a public 
unemployment insurance system that reduces the risk of unemployment and the associated loss 
of wages and other benefits. However, when the public insurance system is weak or does not 
                                                          
4 See also Bronars & Deere (1991), Chen, Chen & Wang (2015), Chino (2016), Huang (2017), Marciukaityte 
(2015) and Matsa (2010) for evidence that the power of unions affects debt policy, payout policy and CEO 
compensation and Ahmad, Beuselinck & Bollaert (2017), Dessaint, Golubov & Volpin (2017), Haw, Hu, Wu & 
Zhang (2018), Petry (2018), Serfling (2016) and Simintzi, Vig & Volpin (2015) for evidence that labor protection 
affects debt policy, payout policy, takeover activity and shareholder value. 
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exist, firms may act as alternative providers of insurance against this risk (Ellul, Pagano & 
Schivardi, 2018). Firms may even have an advantage in providing employment insurance 
relative to governments. They are better positioned to detect opportunistic behavior of 
employees than market-based insurance providers, and they have a greater risk-bearing 
capacity than their employees. Firms may also have an incentive to provide unemployment 
insurance because it can reduce firms’ labor costs if it leads the employees to accept lower 
wages and benefits (Ellul, Pagano & Schivardi, 2018). In addition, it may reduce the significant 
hiring costs that firms are often confronted with, as prospective employees have a tendency to 
shy away from less legitimate firms (e.g., Williamson, 2000). 
Existing evidence from publicly-traded firms suggests that country-level 
unemployment insurance and firm-level insurance are substitutes. Specifically, Ellul, Pagano 
& Schivardi (2018) argue that public firms with long-term owners, who care more about their 
reputation, will find it easier to win the trust of their employees and are more credible in 
offering secure employment. This argument is confirmed by their finding that (listed) family 
firms, who typically have long-term ownership, provide unemployment insurance as a 
substitute for public unemployment insurance, but other firms do not. Thus, a firm’s ownership 
structure can be a source of unemployment insurance. Moreover, Agrawal & Matsa (2013) 
show that higher unemployment benefits at the state level lead to increased leverage for a 
sample of US public firms. In other words, firms choose more conservative financial policies 
(i.e., lower leverage) partly to mitigate workers’ exposure to unemployment risk. 
Firms can also provide unemployment insurance to their employees by increasing their 
cash holdings. These increasing financial buffers reduce the likelihood that firms must fire 
employees in bad times (Devos & Rahman, 2018). Such cash buffers also reduce the risk of 
financial distress, which has been found to hamper the hiring of new employees (Brown & 
Matsa, 2016). Countries differ tremendously in the degree of public employment insurance 
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they provide (e.g., Ellul, Pagano & Schivardi, 2018). For instance, in some countries, there is 
no such insurance (e.g., Colombia) or very limited insurance (e.g., UK), while in other 
countries (e.g., Portugal) the benefits employees receive in the first two years of unemployment 
equal more than 2/3 of their last gross wage. Moreover, the effect of public unemployment 
insurance systems on firm cash holdings is likely to be especially relevant for privately-held 
firms. Contrary to their publicly-traded counterparts, private firms are often viewed as less 
legitimate employers (e.g., Vanacker & Forbes, 2016; Williamson, 2000; Williamson, Cable 
& Aldrich, 2002). Consequently, privately-held firms are often confronted with significant 
challenges to draw the interest of prospective employees, hire new employees and retain them. 
In response to these challenges, privately-held firms may provide employment insurance by 
holding larger cash balances, particularly when these firms operate in countries with weak 
public unemployment insurance. Thus:  
Hypothesis 1: In countries with weaker public unemployment insurance, privately-held 
firms will hold larger cash balances. 
Devos & Rahman (2018) argue that cash holdings of public firms are public information 
used by media, analysts and other parties to generate forecasts and reports which are consumed 
by employees. However, these are typically expected to be less available for private firms. This 
raises the question how cash holdings shape perceptions of employees about unemployment 
risk in private firms. Since our analysis is based on publicly available financial statements, 
information on cash holdings is available to the employees. Furthermore, many firms have 
labor representatives via a works council and/or unions who play an important role in informing 
employees (e.g., Forth, Bryson & George, 2017; van den Berg, Grift, van Witteloostuijn, Boone 
& van der Brempt, 2013). 
So far, we hypothesized on the impact of public unemployment insurance on the level 
of cash holdings for privately-held firms. We next consider the change in cash holdings. 
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McLean & Zhao (2018) find that public firms with a high need for precautionary cash use 
equity issues to fund their cash holdings. However, the primary source of external finance for 
private firms is debt. Indeed, Brav (2009) shows that compared to their public counterparts, 
privately-held firms rely almost exclusively on debt, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to 
avoid external capital markets. The importance of debt is also confirmed for different types of 
private firms, ranging from young firms (Cassar, 2004; Deloof, La Rocca & Vanacker, 2019) 
to high-growth firms (Vanacker & Manigart, 2010). Hence, privately-held firms are expected 
to use debt instead of external equity to fund precautionary cash holdings. If private firms keep 
cash to secure employment, the issuance of new debt by these firms should result in more cash 
holdings in countries with a weaker public unemployment insurance system. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: In countries with weaker public unemployment insurance, the issuance 
of new debt by privately-held firms will result in larger cash balances.  
3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.1. Sample 
We collected data on privately-held firms over the period of 2007-2014 using the March 2016 
version of the Orbis database, compiled by Bureau van Dijk (a Moody’s Analytics company). 
This database contains financial and administrative data on public and private firms worldwide. 
We first retrieved all private firms with a minimum of 2 million EUR revenues. This criterion 
is adopted to exclude micro-firms (revenue less than 2 million EUR according to the European 
Commission’s definition), which often disclosure very limited financial information. Second, 
we excluded firms operating in financial industries (SIC 6000–6999), utilities (SIC 4800–
4999), quasi-regulated industries (SIC 4000–4499) and public administration (SIC 9100-9729). 
Third, we discarded firms for which the ultimate owner is another firm, to ensure that our 
sample firms are not subsidiaries, which may have different incentives for holding cash 
(Beuselinck & Du, 2017). Following the Orbis classification, firms without an ultimate owner 
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are defined as independent firms in which no single corporate shareholder holds more than 
25.01 percent of the firms’ shares. Finally, we excluded firms for which Orbis only has limited 
financial data and firms with missing industry (SIC) classification codes. Finally, we had to 
exclude firms from countries that were missing data on the study’s key variables (e.g., public 
unemployment insurance). Our final sample consists of 1,679,907 firm-year observations 
representing 388,940 private firms from 32 countries around the world. All definitions and data 
sources for the variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 1. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
Following other studies on cash holdings (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz, 1999; 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith & Servaes, 2003), we measure cash holdings by the natural log of cash 
and cash equivalents divided by net assets, i.e. total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. 
The data come from Orbis. In robustness tests, reported below, we also use alternative measures 
such as winsorized cash on net assets. 
3.2.2. Independent variable  
Following Ellul, Pagano & Schivardi (2018), we use the ratio of the average unemployment 
insurance benefits an employee receives in the first two years of unemployment, relative to the 
employee’s last gross wage, as our measure of public insurance against unemployment. This 
measure was originally computed by Aleksynska & Schindler (2011), based on the information 
from various sources including the ILO, OECD, and national agencies. Since the measures of 
Aleksynska & Schindler end in 2005, that is, before the start of our sample in 2007, we use the 
updated measures computed by Ellul, Pagano & Schivardi (2018).5  
                                                          
5 These data were kindly provided by Andrew Ellul. For some countries, the 2014 value was not available, in 
which case we used the 2013 computed value for public unemployment insurance in 2014. Note that public 
unemployment insurance does not change over the period considered in this study for most countries in our 
sample. 
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3.2.3. Control variables 
We consider several country-level and firm-level control variables. As a first country-level 
control, we take into account the effect of access to credit in a country. The owners of private 
firms are typically reluctant to issue outside equity because it is costly and would dilute their 
control (Brav, 2009). Their main external finance source is debt, but the amount of debt they 
can borrow is limited by costly bankruptcy. Furthermore, their small scale limits access to 
public debt markets, and concentrated ownership and informational opacity create significant 
agency problems of debt, which further hamper access to debt (Berger & Udell 1998; García-
Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2008). These limitations to external finance create a strong 
precautionary motive to hold cash, which will be reinforced by shareholder risk aversion if the 
controlling shareholders are under-diversified (Anderson & Hamadi, 2016; Duchin, 2010). It 
can be argued that the increasing ability to get credit on a short notice reduces the need for 
private firms to hold large cash reserves. This argument would imply a negative relationship 
between credit availability and corporate cash holdings. On the other hand, an environment 
that facilitates access to credit makes it easier for private firms to fund cash holdings, which 
could lead to higher cash holdings of private firms.6 We include private credit provided by 
deposit money banks over GDP in each year as a measure of credit availability. We use the 
indicator from the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank, which is 
based on data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and measures credit issued to 
the private sector by deposit money banks (Beck, Demirguç-Kunt & Levine, 2000; Levine, 
2002). It does not include credit issued to governments and state-owned enterprises.  
Access to credit also depends on the legal environment in which firms borrow money 
(e.g., Djankov, McLiesh & Shleifer, 2007; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 
                                                          
6 In this respect, it is interesting to note that even for public firms, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith & Servaes (2003) find a 
positive relation between corporate cash holdings and the availability of private credit in a country. 
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1997; Qian & Strahan, 2007). Legal Rights is the country-level strength of legal rights index 
of the World Bank, measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the 
rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending for each year. The index ranges 
between 0 (weak) and 12 (strong).7 Furthermore, the enforceability of contracts matters for 
how loans are structured and how they are priced (e.g., Bae and Goyal, 2009). Rule of law is 
the country-level rule of law score for each year developed by the World Bank, measuring the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. We use the aggregate country scores, which range from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) (see www.govindicators.org for more information).8  
Additionally, we use annual GDP growth as a control for economic growth. We further 
include measures of employment regulation (e.g., Serfling, 2016; Simintzi, Vig & Volpin, 
2015), and the degree of unionization in countries (e.g., Huang, Jiang, Lie & Que, 2017; Klasa, 
Maxwell & Ortiz-Molina, 2009; Matsa, 2010). Legal labor protection is a synthetic indicator 
constructed by the OECD, which measures the strictness of regulation against dismissals in 
regular labor contracts (e.g., Simintzi, Vig & Volpin, 2015).9 Union density is also obtained 
from the OECD and measures the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members 
to the total number of wage and salary earners, based on surveys wherever possible or on 
administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed members otherwise. Both 
                                                          
7 See https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology/getting-credit for more information on the construction of 
this measure. 
8 In unreported regressions we additionally include the ratio of general government gross debt over GDP (source: 
IMF) as a determinant of corporate cash holdings. High government debt may reduce the availability of credit to 
private firms, thereby increasing the need to hoard cash. Including this variable does not affect our findings on 
the relation between public unemployment insurance and corporate cash holdings. 
9 The 2014 score for labor protection was not available for some countries. In those cases, we again used the 2013 
score. Importantly, prior evidence indicates that employment laws remain very stable over time. Capron & Guillén 
(2009), for instance, report a 0.95 correlation between their labor rights index of the early 1990s and the index of 
the early 2000s. 
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dimensions of labor protection have been found to affect corporate financing policies of public 
firms. Stronger labor protection may lead to more cash holdings because it reduces wage 
flexibility and makes it more difficult to lay off employees. The resulting increase in operating 
leverage makes firms riskier (Chen, Kacperczyk & Ortiz-Molina, 2011), which could increase 
their demand for precautionary cash. However, better labor protection could also induce firms 
to keep less cash, because higher cash holdings weaken the bargaining position of firms against 
their employees (Klasa, Maxwell & Ortiz-Molina, 2009). When a firm has less cash, it can 
make a more credible case to its employees that the risk of a cash shortage threatens its 
competitive position. Firms may, therefore, try to keep cash holdings low to shelter profits from 
employees’ demands.10  
We also control for firm-level variables that are obtained from the Orbis database. As 
for the firm-level determinants of cash holdings, we consider a number of variables that have 
been found to affect cash holdings (e.g., Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith 
& Servaes, 2003; Gao, Harford & Kai, 2013; Hall, Mateus & Bezhentseva Mateus, 2014; 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz, 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004), taking into account the 
information available in the Orbis database. The Pecking Order Theory of Myers & Majluf 
(1984) predicts that profitable firms will accumulate cash to finance future investments, while 
firms with low cash flows will use their cash to finance investment, resulting in a positive 
relation between ebit and cash holdings.11, 12 It also predicts that firms will only take on debt 
when they do not have enough internal funding to finance their investments. This behavior is 
                                                          
10 Additionally, from an agency perspective, labor unions are a governance mechanism which may limit managers' 
access to free cash flow. 
11 We consider ebit rather than a cash flow measure because the information in the Orbis database does not allow 
us to estimate cash flows for many firms in our sample. 
12 It can be expected that capital expenditures will reduce cash holdings (e.g., Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011). 
Unfortunately, since depreciation is not available for a large part of our sample, we also have no clean measure 
of capital expenditures. However, when we add the increase in (the natural log of) net assets as a proxy of capital 
expenditures in the regressions of Table 5, this does not affect our findings for public unemployment insurance at 
all. 
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likely to result in a negative relation between leverage and cash. Cash is a buffer that can absorb 
negative shocks. Firms with more volatile profits, as measured by volatility, are therefore likely 
to hold more cash for precautionary reasons, to protect themselves against the likelihood of a 
cash shortfall (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011). Larger and older firms may find it easier to get 
external financing because of lower asymmetric information. We therefore also include 
log(size) and log(age) as cash holdings determinants.13 Size additionally takes into account 
economies of scale in cash management. Following Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal (2011),  Gao, 
Harford & Kai (2013) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Williamson & Stulz (1999), sales growth is our 
measure of growth opportunities.14 Since the cost of a cash shortage is higher for firms with 
strong growth opportunities, high growth firms are expected to hold more cash. Net working 
capital can be a cash substitute because it consists of assets that can be easily converted into 
cash (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith & Servaes, 2003; Gao, Harford & Kai, 2013). We additionally 
include intangibility, defined as the ratio of intangible assets (may include R&D expenses and 
the value of patents, trademarks, and brands) to total assets, as a proxy for financial distress 
costs, which may induce firms to hold more cash (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011). Finally, a 
higher tax rate increases the tax benefits of debt and the opportunity cost of cash holdings 
(Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011). Ebit, leverage, volatility, net working capital, sales growth, 
intangibility and tax rate are winsorized at the 1% lower and upper level. 
3.3. Summary statistics and correlations 
Table 2 reports for each country over the period 2007-2014 the number of firm-year 
observations, median cash holdings and average score of public unemployment insurance and 
                                                          
13 We take the log of size and age to account for the non-linear effect on cash holdings found in other studies (e.g., 
Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2012; Gao, Harford & Kai, 2013; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). 
14 Obviously, we cannot use Tobin’s Q as the firms in our sample are not listed.  
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the other country characteristics.15 Our sample includes 1,282,062 observations for European 
firms, 354,107 observations for firms in Asia, Australia, and New Zealand, and 43,738 
observations for the Americas. The median cash to net assets ratio ranges from 0.03 in India 
and Peru to 0.52 in Singapore. Table 2 shows that we have a lot of variation in our sample with 
respect to country characteristics. Public insurance ranges between zero (Philippines, 
Singapore, Columbia, Peru) and 0.67 (Portugal). Private credit by deposit money banks is 
between 27.85% (Peru) and 194.37% (Hong Kong) of GDP. The Rule of Law index in our 
sample ranges between -0.73 (Argentina) and 1.96 (Finland), while the legal rights measure is 
between two (Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Portugal) and 12 (New Zealand), which is the highest 
possible score.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the firm-level variables. The median (mean) cash 
(winsorized at 1%) holdings is 0.09 (0.23). The median (mean) ratio of debt (excluding trade 
credit) to net assets is 0.17 (0.24). Investment in net working capital, which is a potentially 
important alternative source of liquidity for private firms, is on average 28% of net assets (the 
median is also 28%). 
Table 4 reports pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables. 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, public insurance is negatively related to cash holdings (r=-
0.18). Cash holdings are positively related to private credit (r=0.18), rule of law (r=0.26) and 
legal rights (r=0.12). This suggests that more available credit, a stronger rule of law and better 
legal protection in a country increase cash holdings of private firms.  
Table 4 further shows that public insurance is strongly and positively related to other measures 
of worker protection such as legal labor protection (r=0.66). Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes & Shleifer (2004) argue that in every country a complex system of laws protects the 
                                                          
15 We report median cash holdings because our sample includes some outlying values for cash holdings. In the 
regression analysis, the effect of these outliers is absorbed by using log(cash) as the dependent variable (table 5) 
or by winsorizing cash at the 1% upper level (table 6).  
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interests of workers. More specifically, they highlight that this complex system covers distinct 
bodies of laws: “Employment laws govern the individual employment contract. … Social 
security laws govern the social response to needs and conditions that have a significant impact 
on the quality of life, such as old age, disability, death, sickness, and unemployment” (p. 1339-
1340). Our legal labor protection measure relates to the first body of laws, i.e., it is an indicator 
of strictness of regulation of individual employee contracts. These laws relate to the situation 
where there is (still) a relationship between the employer and employee. Public unemployment 
insurance relates to the second body of law. It captures the temporary income to individuals 
who are involuntarily unemployed and are actively seeking jobs in order to help them maintain 
lost income and their standard of living. Thus, these laws relate to the situation after the 
employer-employee relationship ended. While empirically correlated, it is clear that these are 
theoretically different constructs. As we detail below, in our subsequent multivariate 
regressions, we do take into account that these variables are highly correlated and run models 
with only public insurance and models with public insurance and the other measures of labor 
protection. 
4. REGRESSION RESULTS 
4.1. The determinants of cash holdings 
To investigate the determinants of cash holdings, we estimate firm random effects regressions 
that include industry fixed effects based on 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and 
year fixed effects.16 Results are reported in Table 5. Significance levels are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by countries.  
Since this study is the first to investigate the determinants of cash holdings by private 
firms for a worldwide sample, we start by considering the relation between firm characteristics 
                                                          
16 At this stage, we do not include country fixed effects, because these would largely absorb the effect of the public 
insurance, which for most countries in our sample does not change over the period considered in this study. For 
the same reason we cannot include firm fixed effects. 
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and cash holdings in regression 1. The results are generally as expected. More profitable firms 
and firms with more volatile profits hold more cash. The results also suggest that net working 
capital is a significant substitute for cash holdings.17 Furthermore, larger firms hold less cash, 
which is consistent with economies of scale in cash management. Interestingly, we find that 
older firms hold more cash, which does not support the information asymmetry argument but 
confirms the results of Gao, Harford & Kai (2013) on cash holdings of private U.S. firms. This 
finding is consistent with a life-cycle effect where mature firms hold more cash than young 
firms because they are more profitable and have fewer attractive investment opportunities (e.g. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz, 2006). The coefficients for the other firm characteristics are not 
statistically significant.  
We add country characteristics in regression 2. Both private credit and rule of law are 
significantly and positively related to cash holdings, suggesting that an increase in credit 
availability and a stronger rule of law leads private firms to hold more cash. These findings are 
consistent with the argument that more developed credit markets and a stronger rule of law 
facilitate cash holdings by private firms. GDP growth is also positively and significantly related 
to corporate cash holdings. It is noteworthy that including country characteristics strongly 
increases the explanatory power of our empirical model: the R2 increases from 0.191 in 
regression 1 to 0.256 in regression 2, confirming that the country environment in which private 
firms operate explains a large part of the variation in their cash holdings. 
Legal Rights has a statistically significant negative effect in regressions 3, 4 and 5, 
while Rule of Law has a significant positive effect on cash holdings, which is remarkable since 
both variables are strongly correlated (r = 0.64 for our sample). While Legal Rights measures 
                                                          
17 The individual components of net working capital (trade receivables, inventories and trade payables) are likely 
to have different effects on cash holdings (Wu, Rui & Wu, 2012). To ascertain that this does not influence our 
results for public insurance, as a robustness check we re-estimated our main regressions with trade receivables, 
inventories and trade payables as separate variables. The results are very similar to the ones reported in the paper. 
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the degree in which the law facilitates access to credit, Rule of Law measures the extent to 
which people have confidence in and abide by the laws. This is a related but different concept. 
A number of studies have found that corporate cash holdings are negatively related to 
corruption, arguing that firms hold less cash in more corrupt environments because cash 
holdings facilitate expropriation of the firm in a corrupt environment (Andriosopoulos, Loncan 
& Michaely, 2019; Caprio, Faccio & McConnell, 2013; Smith, 2016; Svensson; 2003). Since 
the concept of corruption is closely related to the rule of law (there is an almost perfect 
correlation between the Control of Corruption index and the Rule of Law index of the World 
Bank), this might be the driving force behind the positive relation between the Rule of Law 
and cash holdings we find. The negative relation between Legal Rights and cash holdings, on 
the other hand, might reflect that an improvement in legal rights facilitates access to debt and 
therefore reduces the need to hold cash. 
When we add our key variable public unemployment insurance in regression 3, it is 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level and negatively related to corporate cash holdings, 
confirming Hypothesis 1 that better public unemployment insurance reduces the need for firms 
to hold precautionary cash.18 This effect is also economically significant: a one standard 
deviation increase in public insurance decreases cash holdings by 32.6%.19 We found in table 
3 that public unemployment insurance is positively correlated with legal labor protection and 
union density. When both dimensions of labor protection are added in regression 4, the negative 
effect of public unemployment insurance remains highly significant.20 Legal labor protection 
                                                          
18 The negative effect of public unemployment insurance remains significant at the 0.1% level when we replace 
Rule of Law with the Control of Corruption index of the World Bank, which is significantly and positively related 
to cash holdings. This is also the case when we exclude Rule of Law or Legal rights from the regression. 
19 The economic significance is calculated as: Ln(cash1) – ln(cash0) = ln(cash1/cash0) = st.dev. (public insurance) 
* coefficient public insurance = 0.193 * (-2.046) = -0.395. Percentage change in cash = exp(-0.395) – 1 = -32.6%.  
20 Multicollinearity could be a concern for the interpretation of Regression 4. Nevertheless, in situations where 
multicollinearity is a concern, the standard error of the coefficients (of two or more highly correlated variables) 
will increase. By overinflating the standard errors, multicollinearity makes some variables statistically 
insignificant when they should be significant. Accordingly, although multicollinearity works against finding 
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and union density are also negatively related to cash holdings, confirming that private firms 
hold less cash in countries where unemployment risk for employees is lower.  
We also consider the possibility that the effect of public unemployment insurance is 
non-linear: the marginal benefit of increasing public unemployment insurance could be larger 
at lower levels of insurance than at higher levels of insurance. When we distinguish between 
countries where public insurance is weak (regression 5) and countries where public insurance 
is strong (regression 6), using the median public insurance as split-off value, we find 
confirmation of a non-linear effect. The effect of public insurance is statistically significant 
only for countries with weak public insurance.21 In other words, differences in public insurance 
matter for cash holdings below the median public insurance value of 0.44, but not anymore 
above the median. 
 Our results are confirmed by some robustness checks, of which the findings are 
reported in the appendix. First, our results are confirmed when cash (winsorized at 1%) is the 
dependent variable instead of log(cash) (Table A.1).22 Instead of random effects regressions, 
we estimated OLS regressions and cross-sectional regressions on the mean value for all 
variables, again with very similar results (Table A.2). Our results might be affected by 
survivorship bias because disappearing firms are deleted from the Orbis dataset after three 
years. To ascertain that survivorship does not drive our results, we re-estimated all regressions 
for a subsample that includes only the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, which are not affected by 
survivorship. Again, our base results are confirmed (Table A.2). Our sample consists of 
privately held firms, including large firms, which raises the question to what extent the results 
in Table 5 reflect policies of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To check whether 
                                                          
support for our Hypothesis 1, we still find a negative and highly significant coefficient for Public insurance in 
Regression 4. 
21 A Chow test further confirms that the coefficients of public insurance are significantly different in regressions 
5 and 6 (F-statistic = 3,611.37). 
22 The results are also confirmed when we winsorize cash at the 2% level. 
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our findings apply to SMEs, we re-estimated all the regressions in Table 5 for a sample 
consisting of firms with no more than 250 employees.23 The results in Appendix Table A.3 
fully confirm those for the full sample. Finally, the effect of public unemployment insurance 
on cash holdings might be weaker for high risk firms because these firms need high cash 
balances, irrespective of public unemployment insurance.24 We test this conjecture by 
estimating separate regressions for low risk firms (i.e. volatility < sample median) and high 
risk firms (i.e. volatility ≥ sample median) and estimating a regression which includes the 
interaction between public unemployment insurance and volatility. The results, which are 
reported in Appendix Table A.4, indicate that the effect of public unemployment insurance is 
indeed significantly weaker for high risk firms compared to low risk firms, but it remains highly 
significant. 
4.2. Change in cash holdings 
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate an empirical model that closely follows models of Almeida, 
Campello & Weisbach (2004) and Kusnadi & Wei (2011), and takes into account the 
availability of data for private firms in the Orbis database: 
∆Cashit = a + b1 ∆Leverageit + b2 ∆Log(size)it + b3 Ebitit + b4 ∆Net working capitalit  
+ b5 Log(size)it + b6 Sales growthit + b7 (Industry FE)i + b8 (Year FE)t + b8 
(Country FE)i +  eit (1) 
The effect of the change in leverage reflects the extent to which a change in debt is 
associated with a change in cash holdings.25 Since depreciation is not available for a large part 
of our sample, we use the increase in (the natural log of) net assets as a proxy of investments 
and ebit as a proxy for cash flow. Additionally, the effect of the change in net working capital 
reflects the degree to which net working capital and cash holdings are substitutes. Following 
                                                          
23 Applying this threshold reduces the sample to 933,645 observations because we lack information on employees 
for a substantial number of countries. Countries for which the number of employees is not known are left out of 
the SME sample. 
24 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
25 This analysis is based on cash holdings winsorized at the 1% upper level. We obtain very similar results when 
the dependent variable is the change in unwinsorized log(cash), see Appendix Table A.5.   
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Almeida, Campello & Weisbach (2004) and Kusnadi & Wei (2011), we also include log(size) 
as a measure of economies of scale in cash management and sales growth as a measure of 
investment opportunities. An advantage of focusing on changes in cash is that it allows 
controlling for country fixed effects, which was not possible in the previous regressions 
because in most countries in our sample public unemployment insurance did not change over 
the period considered in this study. We also control for industry and year fixed effects (Kusnadi 
& Wei, 2011).26  
We estimate model (1) separately for countries with weak (i.e. below median) public 
unemployment insurance and countries with strong (i.e. above median) public unemployment 
insurance. The results are reported in Table 6. We find indeed that an increase in leverage is 
more strongly associated with an increase in cash holdings in countries with weak public 
unemployment insurance (regression 7) than in countries with strong public unemployment 
insurance (regression 8).27 This finding again confirms the effect of public unemployment 
insurance on corporate cash holdings. Additionally, we include the interaction between ∆ 
Leverage and the level of public unemployment insurance in regression 9, which is estimated 
for the full sample. The interaction has a statistically significant and negative effect on change 
in cash, confirming Hypothesis 2 that the issuance of new debt by privately-held firms results 
in larger cash balances in countries with weaker public unemployment insurance.28 The effect 
of public insurance is also economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in public 
                                                          
26 The model does not include the main effect of the Public Insurance variable because its effect is absorbed by 
the country fixed effects. 
27 A Chow test further confirms that the coefficients of leverage are significantly different between regressions 7 
and 8 (F-statistic = 2,818.14). 
28 When we additionally include the interaction between Ebit and public insurance in the regression, the coefficient 
of this interaction term is negative but not statistically significant. This finding indicates that weaker public 
unemployment insurance does not significantly increase the propensity to save cash out of cash flows. Cash flows 
are volatile and firms may prefer a more stable source of funding for precautionary cash balances to provide 
unemployment insurance. 
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insurance reduces the effect of a change in leverage on the change in cash by 22.9%.29 Again, 
our results are fully confirmed if we consider SMEs only (see Appendix Table A.6). 
5. CONCLUSION 
While there have been many studies on the determinants of cash holdings by publicly-traded 
firms, we do not know much about what determines cash holdings by privately-held firms. This 
lack of research is remarkable since private firms are the dominant corporate form across the 
world. Our evidence suggests that private firm managers use cash resources to govern the 
employer-employee relationship. More specifically, private firm managers hold larger cash 
balances in countries with weaker unemployment protection to reduce (prospective) 
employees’ perceptions of unemployment risk. 
This paper is the first to study the determinants of cash holdings by private firms for a 
worldwide sample. The scarce literature on cash holdings of private firms focuses on a single 
country (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011; Deloof, 2001; Gao, Harford & Kai, 2013; García-
Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2008; Martínez-Sola, García-Teruel & Martínez-Solano, 2018) or 
on a geographically limited set of countries (Hall, Mateus & Bezhentseva Mateus, 2014). Our 
study allows us to examine the generalizability of results from these previous studies, which is 
an increasingly important concern in many research fields (Bettis, Helfat & Shaver, 2016). For 
instance, Italian evidence has shown that both bank debt and net working capital represent good 
cash-substitutes for private firms (e.g., Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2011). In our worldwide 
sample of private firms, we also find that net working capital is a substitute for cash holdings, 
which suggests this is a “stylized fact”. But, we fail to find strong evidence that debt represents 
a good cash substitute (except in countries where public unemployment insurance is above the 
median level, which includes Italy).  
                                                          
29 The economic significance is calculated as: st.dev. (public insurance) * coefficient ( leverage * public 
insurance) / coefficient ( leverage) = 0.193 * (-0.513) / 0.433 = -22.9%. 
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In addition, our study also forms the basis for a broader contribution to an institution-
based perspective (van Essen, Strike, Carney & Sapp, 2015) on cash holdings in private firms. 
Specifically, we focus on one of the most important but often ignored stakeholders of privately-
held firms: employees. We find that an increase in public unemployment insurance 
significantly reduces cash holdings of private firms, especially at low levels of public 
unemployment insurance. Furthermore, private firms keep a larger part of debt issues as 
precautionary cash when public unemployment insurance is weak.  
More generally, we find that cash holdings of private firms are substantially affected by 
country characteristics. Private firms hold more cash in an environment that facilitates access 
to debt, that is, countries with more developed private credit markets and a better rule of law. 
An explanation for this result is that better access to credit drives private firms to hold more 
cash because under-diversified shareholders wanting to keep control reduce their dependence 
on external financing. Private firms also hold less cash in countries with better legal protection 
of labor and stronger unions, which is consistent with the argument that cash holdings weaken 
the bargaining position of firms against their employees. Combined, our results show that the 
environment in which private firms operate matters a lot for their cash policy. 
It is a limitation of our study that we cannot fully ascertain the causal effect of 
unemployment insurance on corporate cash holdings. Our empirical model may not fully 
capture country-level frictions in financial and labor markets. Substantial changes in the 
unemployment insurance system in some of the countries in our sample would allow for a 
difference-in-differences analysis. Unfortunately, there were no such ‘shocks’ in the period 
considered in this study. Furthermore, our sample covers an era in which many things happened 
in different countries: even if we were able to identify unemployment insurance shocks, it 
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would be very hard to isolate the effect of these shocks.30 However, our results hold after 
controlling for a large number of firm and country characteristics that affect corporate cash 
holdings (including other dimensions of labor market institutions), they are driven by those 
countries where unemployment insurance is weak or non-existent, and they are confirmed 
when we investigate the effect of debt issues on the change of cash holdings within firms.31 All 
these results point to a causal effect of unemployment insurance on corporate cash holdings. 
Our findings have implications for managers and policy-makers. For managers, our 
findings highlight that firm cash holdings will be significantly influenced by the business 
environment in which their firms operate. There is significant evidence that private firms and 
especially small and medium-sized firms, experience major difficulties in attracting employees 
(Williamson, 2000). Our results suggest that in countries with weak public unemployment 
insurance, firms try to provide employment insurance by holding larger cash balances. Whether 
this approach is indeed successful and eases the attraction of employees (or facilitates the 
retention of key employees) remains an important avenue for future research. For policy-
makers, our findings suggest that a generous public unemployment insurance system not only 
benefits employees but also the firms by which they are employed. Indeed, while cash holdings 
entail an important cost, better public unemployment insurance for employees allows firms to 
reduce their investment in cash reserves.  
                                                          
30 There was a reduction in public unemployment insurance in Denmark (2010) but we have only eight 
observations for Denmark, and there were increases in Ireland (2008) and Italy (2009) but these coincided with 
the financial crisis which hit both countries hard and makes it basically impossible to test the effect in a clean 
way. 
31 Note that this latter finding involves the interaction effect between the change in leverage and public 
unemployment insurance. Bun and Harrison (2019: 823) show that potential “endogeneity bias can be reduced to 
zero for the OLS estimator as far as the interaction term is concerned” and that “Whenever IV based inference 
procedures fail, we show that the OLS estimator of the coefficient of the interaction term is consistent, and that 
standard OLS inference applies.” 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Description Data source 
Public insurance  Ratio of average unemployment insurance benefits 
an employee receives in the first two years of 
unemployment, relative to the employee’s last gross 
wage 
Andrew Ellul, as described in 
Ellul, Pagano & Schivardi 
(2018) 
Other country characteristics   
Private credit Private credit by deposit money banks / GDP Financial Development and 
Structure Dataset World Bank  
Rule of law Perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence 
World Governance Indicators 
World Bank  
Legal rights Degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws 
protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus 
facilitate lending 
World Development Indicators 
World Bank  
GDP growth Growth of annual GDP World Development Indicators 
World Bank  
Legal labor protection Strictness of employment protection (regular 
contracts) 
OECD Employment Protection 
Database  
Union density Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade 
union members, divided by the total number of 
wage and salary earners 
OECD Employment and Labor 
Market Statistics 
Firm characteristics   
Log(cash) Natural log of (cash and cash equivalents / net 
assets) 
Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Ebit Ebit / net assets Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Volatility Standard deviation of (ebit / net assets) Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Log(size) Natural log of net assets Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Log(age) Natural log of firm age  Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Sales growth (Sales in year t / sales in year t-1) – 1 Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Leverage Debt (excluding trade credit) / net assets Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Net working capital (inventories + receivables – payables) / net assets Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Intangibility Intangible assets / net assets Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Tax rate 1 – (profit after tax / profit before tax) Orbis Bureau Van Dijk 
Note. This table shows the definition and data sources for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Net assets 
is total assets net of cash and cash equivalent. All variables are yearly measured except volatility, which is 
measured over the 2007-2014 period. All financial variables are expressed in USD. Ebit, volatility, net working 
capital, tax rate, sales growth, leverage and intangibility are winsorized at the 1% lower and upper level. 
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Table 2. Cash (median) and country characteristics (average) by country, 2007-2014 
 
Country No. of obs. Cash Public 
insurance 
Private 
credit 
Rule of law Legal rights GDP growth Legal labor 
protection 
Union 
density 
Asia and Australasia 354,107         
Australia 1,097 0.07 0.17 131.12 1.76 11.00 2.50 1.67 17.04 
Hong Kong 1,265 0.19 0.11 194.37 1.55 7.00 3.09 . . 
India 3,653 0.03 0.13 49.62 -0.08 6.00 6.64 3.29 . 
Israel 303 0.09 0.17 65.22 0.96 6.00 3.16 2.04 22.80 
Japan 273,120 0.26 0.11 179.35 1.42 4.00 1.36 1.37 17.78 
New Zealand 137 0.06 0.25 139.65 1.87 12.00 -0.54 1.56 21.04 
Philippines 2,206 0.05 0.00 29.87 -0.54 3.00 6.62 . . 
Singapore 8 0.52 0.00 100.33 1.70 8.00 4.17 . . 
Thailand 41,088 0.04 0.13 128.57 -0.15 3.00 2.70 2.92 . 
Turkey 31,230 0.05 0.15 53.15 0.08 3.00 4.19 2.31 7.00 
Europe 1,282,062         
Austria 5,353 0.05 0.38 94.02 1.84 5.00 0.75 2.37 28.38 
Belgium 19,940 0.08 0.35 56.20 1.40 4.00 1.65 1.89 55.02 
Czech Republic 60,262 0.10 0.12 47.78 1.01 5.00 2.00 3.05 15.83 
Denmark 8 0.12 0.35 189.01 1.92 8.00 0.38 2.17 66.89 
Finland 19,250 0.09 0.31 87.34 1.96 7.00 -0.71 2.17 69.21 
France 200,118 0.19 0.47 94.94 1.44 4.00 0.58 2.38 7.72 
Germany 54,897 0.06 0.24 84.54 1.64 6.00 1.08 2.68 18.49 
Greece 26,243 0.07 0.16 102.00 0.61 3.00 -3.24 2.80 22.60 
Ireland 2,301 0.08 0.31 122.14 1.74 7.00 1.10 1.27 31.47 
Italy 472,067 0.04 0.53 90.01 0.37 2.00 0.09 2.76 36.33 
Netherlands 1398 0.05 0.50 116.35 1.81 3.00 1.40 2.82 18.37 
Poland 46,126 0.05 0.11 49.64 0.75 7.00 3.28 2.23 14.58 
Portugal 44,363 0.05 0.67 155.54 1.04 2.00 -1.13 4.13 19.76 
Spain 222,823 0.06 0.50 161.36 1.13 5.00 -1.00 2.21 16.89 
Sweden 45,927 0.14 0.36 123.12 1.95 6.00 1.24 2.61 68.22 
Switzerland 490 0.12 0.53 156.58 1.80 6.00 1.80 1.60 17.12 
United Kingdom 60,496 0.08 0.09 168.22 1.70 7.00 1.91 1.26 25.82 
South America 43,738         
Argentina 82 0.06 0.17 13.31 -0.73 2.00 0.62 1.82 . 
Brazil 1,218 0.05 0.08 73.00 -0.11 2.00 3.02 1.43 . 
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Chile 32 0.08 0.11 99.67 1.34 4.00 3.98 2.63 15.03 
Colombia 42,394 0.04 0.00 41.73 -0.39 4.00 4.39 1.37 . 
Peru 12 0.03 0.00 27.85 -0.60 8.00 5.85 1.75 . 
Total  1,679,907         
Note. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics for firm-level variables 
 
 
Median Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Log(cash) -2.42 -2.79 2.11 -17.07 12.39 
Cash (winsorized at 1%) 0.09 0.23 0.37 0 2.20 
Ebit 0.06 0.11 0.14 -0.14 0.92 
Volatility 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.90 
Log(size) 8.18 8.34 1.39 -3.00 20.43 
Log(age) 3.09 3.09 0.80 0.00 4.76 
Sales growth 0.03 0.18 0.92 -0.70 10.02 
Leverage 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Net working capital 0.28 0.28 0.28 -0.59 0.90 
Intangibility 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.51 
Tax rate 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.00 2.42 
Note. This table shows summary statistics for the firm-level variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. All statistics are based on the full sample of 
1,679,907 observations, except for labor protection (1,618,703 observations) and union density (1,562,332 
observations). 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients  
 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Public insurance 1.00                
Other country characteristics                 
2. Private credit -0.14 1.00               
3. Rule of law -0.16 0.50 1.00              
4. Legal rights -0.47 0.22 0.64 1.00             
5. GDP growth -0.40 -0.14 0.00 0.26 1.00            
6. Legal labor protection 0.66 -0.61 -0.48 -0.45 -0.17 1.00           
7. Union density 0.23 -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.17 0.24 1.00          
Firm characteristics                 
8. Log(cash) -0.18 0.18 0.24 0.12 0.05 -0.24 -0.17 1.00         
9. Ebit -0.03 -0.13 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.34 1.00        
10. Volatility 0.00 -0.06 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.23 0.46 1.00       
11. Log(size) -0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.12 0.04 -0.27 -0.27 -0.28 1.00      
12. Log(age) -0.32 0.10 -0.03 0.14 0.14 -0.19 -0.10 0.01 -0.11 -0.16 0.30 1.00     
13. Sales growth 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.12 -0.08 -0.19 1.00    
14. Leverage -0.17 0.32 0.13 0.03 0.01 -0.26 -0.09 -0.10 -0.20 -0.12 0.13 0.04 -0.03 1.00   
15. Net working capital 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.04 1.00  
16. Intangibility 0.13 -0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.16 1.00 
17. Tax rate 0.20 -0.13 -0.26 -0.33 -0.12 0.17 0.23 -0.15 -0.15 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 
Note. This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Each correlation coefficient is based on the maximum number of available 
observations for both variables. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. All correlations are significant at the 1% level except the correlation between Log(cash) 
and sales growth which is significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5. Public unemployment insurance and cash holdings 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: All firms All firms All firms All firms Public 
insurance 
< median 
Public 
insurance 
≥ median 
Public insurance    -2.046*** -1.311*** -3.903*** 0.764 
   (-5.606) (-3.486) (-3.910) (1.473) 
Other country characteristics       
Legal labor protection     -0.384*   
    (-2.410)   
Union density    -0.009***   
    (-3.743)   
Private Credit  0.008** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.001 
  (2.577) (3.851) (3.301) (1.387) (0.496) 
Rule of Law  0.520** 0.638*** 0.567*** 0.875*** 0.532*** 
  (2.967) (3.820) (5.986) (3.543) (6.888) 
Legal rights  -0.073 -0.194** -0.218*** -0.330*** 0.080 
  (-0.955) (-3.019) (-3.976) (-3.390) (1.596) 
GDP growth   0.049*** 0.031** 0.031** 0.007 0.046** 
  (3.665) (3.100) (3.197) (1.456) (2.904) 
Firm characteristics       
Ebit  2.761*** 2.790*** 2.762*** 2.758*** 2.593*** 2.909*** 
 (17.249) (20.355) (18.908) (17.585) (13.000) (13.357) 
Volatility 0.713* 0.777*** 0.838*** 0.975*** 0.955*** 0.926*** 
 (2.215) (5.933) (6.822) (8.748) (4.775) (23.184) 
Log(size) -0.451*** -0.445*** -0.443*** -0.459*** -0.364*** -0.523*** 
 (-11.372) (-12.154) (-11.960) (-13.619) (-14.215) (-29.314) 
Log(age) 0.350* 0.312*** 0.221*** 0.292*** 0.156* 0.341*** 
 (2.259) (4.434) (3.467) (8.095) (1.967) (8.645) 
Sales growth 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.016* 0.016*** 
 (0.068) (0.737) (0.215) (0.684) (-2.574) (8.079) 
Leverage 0.138 -0.216 -0.365* -0.402* -0.127 -0.604*** 
 (0.408) (-1.051) (-2.165) (-2.275) (-0.849) (-3.357) 
Net working capital -0.977*** -0.939*** -0.876*** -0.877*** -0.733*** -0.991*** 
 (-8.590) (-8.954) (-7.263) (-6.520) (-12.017) (-7.471) 
Intangibility -0.385 -0.288 -0.051 -0.158 0.075 -0.215 
 (-0.964) (-1.387) (-0.303) (-0.925) (0.385) (-1.264) 
Tax rate -0.106 -0.059 -0.051 -0.059 0.067*** -0.075* 
 (-1.530) (-1.238) (-1.091) (-1.356) (4.207) (-2.294) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,679,907 1,679,907 1,679,907 1,562,326 738,645 941,262 
R2 0.191 0.256 0.282 0.297 0.286 0.276 
Note. This table shows regression results. The dependent variable in all regressions is log(cash). All reported results 
are based on random effects regressions. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. T-statistics, 
based on standard errors clustered by countries, in parentheses. 
Ɨ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 6. Public unemployment insurance, change in leverage and change in cash 
holdings 
 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Sample: Public insurance < 
median 
Public insurance ≥ 
median 
All firms 
Leverage * public insurance   -0.513* 
   (-2.344) 
Leverage  0.375*** 0.161*** 0.433*** 
 (4.827) (94.374) (4.079) 
Log(size) -0.321*** -0.313*** -0.316*** 
 (-12.426) (-457.449) (-10.040) 
Ebit 0.260*** 0.222*** 0.238*** 
 (8.025) (159.300) (12.994) 
Net working capital -0.356*** -0.225*** -0.266*** 
 (-8.373) (-206.073) (-5.425) 
Log(size) -0.001 -0.000+ -0.001 
 (-0.828) (-1.663) (-0.822) 
Sales growth 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (5.165) (166.161) (6.327) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 473,958 699,912 1,173,870 
R2 0.369 0.307 0.331 
Note. This table shows regression results. The dependent variable in all regressions is Cash. All 
reported results are based on OLS  regressions. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in 
Table 1, with indicating a change in the variable. T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by 
countries, in parentheses. 
 Ɨ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Appendix: Results of additional analyses 
Table A.1. The dependent variable is cash (winsorized at the 1% level) instead of log(cash) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: All firms All firms All firms All firms Public 
insurance 
< median 
Public 
insurance 
≥ median 
Public insurance    -0.192*** -0.081+ -0.411* 0.078 
   (-4.403) (-1.719) (-2.354) (0.483) 
Other country characteristics       
Legal labor protection     -0.064***   
    (-3.727)   
Union density    -0.001   
    (-1.597)   
Private Credit  0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** -0.000 
  (2.813) (4.659) (3.667) (2.783) (-0.007) 
Rule of Law  0.072** 0.081*** 0.072** 0.099*** 0.058*** 
  (3.211) (3.940) (3.265) (3.804) (3.976) 
Legal rights  -0.016+ -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.001 
  (-1.832) (-4.330) (-4.199) (-3.443) (-0.134) 
GDP growth   0.004** 0.003* 0.003+ 0.000 0.007* 
  (2.732) (2.049) (1.956) (0.273) (2.224) 
Firm characteristics       
Ebit  0.839*** 0.843*** 0.842*** 0.849*** 0.805*** 0.881*** 
 (19.785) (19.512) (19.326) (19.352) (16.745) (12.655) 
Volatility 0.294*** 0.315*** 0.323*** 0.352*** 0.390*** 0.291*** 
 (7.900) (6.699) (6.408) (7.157) (6.476) (6.141) 
Log(size) -0.112*** -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.115*** -0.107*** -0.108*** 
 (-11.115) (-11.891) (-11.683) (-11.964) (-8.797) (-6.844) 
Log(age) 0.073** 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.042* 0.090*** 
 (2.649) (4.294) (3.986) (5.940) (2.173) (4.038) 
Sales growth -0.004+ -0.004+ -0.004+ -0.004 -0.009*** -0.001 
 (-1.717) (-1.724) (-1.891) (-1.641) (-5.634) (-1.031) 
Leverage 0.143*** 0.107*** 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.111*** 0.086*** 
 (5.478) (8.248) (9.136) (8.593) (7.055) (4.517) 
Net working capital -0.243*** -0.238*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.286*** -0.213*** 
 (-5.811) (-6.436) (-6.345) (-5.929) (-9.127) (-4.664) 
Intangibility -0.044 -0.040 -0.022 -0.034 0.028 -0.057 
 (-0.613) (-0.628) (-0.342) (-0.511) (0.516) (-0.805) 
Tax rate 0.015* 0.019** 0.019** 0.018** 0.029*** 0.015* 
 (2.129) (2.927) (3.040) (2.926) (7.199) (2.548) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,679,907 1,679,907 1,679,907 1,562,326 738,645 941,262 
R2 0.304 0.341 0.351 0.362 0.308 0.397 
Note. This table shows regression results. All reported results are based on random effects regressions. Variable 
definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by countries, in 
parentheses. 
Ɨ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00  
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Table A.2. Pooled OLS, cross-section, and 2012-2014 period 
 
Method/sample: Pooled OLS Cross-section 2012-2014 period 
Public Insurance  -2.229*** -1.808*** -2.325*** -1.866*** -2.000*** -1.413** 
 (-5.203) (-5.041) (-6.020) (-4.648) (-4.793) (-3.286) 
Legal labor protection   -0.243+  -0.256+  -0.334 
  (-1.904)  (-1.858)  (-1.548) 
Union density  -0.011***  -0.010***  -0.012** 
  (-4.500)  (-4.050)  (-3.629) 
Private Credit 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006* 
 (3.697) (4.328) (4.083) (4.761) (3.737) (2.820) 
Rule of Law 0.832*** 0.740*** 0.752*** 0.697*** 0.812*** 0.745*** 
 (4.292) (6.935) (3.680) (6.170) (4.038) (5.940) 
Legal rights -0.278*** -0.295*** -0.280*** -0.296*** -0.275** -0.309*** 
 (-4.020) (-5.642) (-3.921) (-5.194) (-3.612) (-4.958) 
GDP growth 0.040+ 0.033** 0.044 0.016 0.049 0.039 
 (2.038) (3.052) (1.640) (1.213) (1.425) (1.271) 
Ebit  3.600*** 3.607*** 3.852*** 3.938*** 3.580*** 3.593*** 
 (15.736) (14.874) (16.366) (16.716) (13.887) (13.050) 
Volatility 0.943*** 1.016*** 0.567** 0.623** 0.848*** 0.930*** 
 (7.377) (7.627) (3.520) (3.576) (6.352) (7.047) 
Log(size) -0.321*** -0.335*** -0.294*** -0.316*** -0.321*** -0.334*** 
 (-11.866) (-18.178) (-10.683) (-17.419) (-11.877) (-16.250) 
Log(age) 0.167* 0.228*** 0.127+ 0.197*** 0.160* 0.231*** 
 (2.639) (6.668) (1.921) (5.165) (2.523) (8.482) 
Sales growth -0.043** -0.033* -0.062** -0.048* -0.052*** -0.040** 
 (-3.163) (-2.690) (-3.421) (-2.760) (-3.733) (-3.242) 
Leverage -1.132** -1.141** -1.016** -1.052* -0.992* -0.996* 
 (-2.998) (-2.852) (-2.764) (-2.640) (-2.451) (-2.285) 
Net working capital -0.853*** -0.869*** -0.768** -0.751** -0.772*** -0.778** 
 (-4.362) (-4.070) (-3.490) (-3.091) (-3.819) (-3.424) 
Intangibility -0.141 -0.372+ -0.087 -0.237 -0.281 -0.464* 
 (-0.615) (-1.742) (-0.342) (-0.974) (-1.283) (-2.151) 
Tax rate -0.219* -0.217* -0.257 -0.260 -0.200 -0.201 
 (-2.300) (-2.422) (-1.257) (-1.280) (-1.487) (-1.463) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
N 1,679,907 1,562,326 388,940 364,317 789,796 722,096 
R2 0.298 0.313 0.366 0.385 0.318 0.333 
Note. This table shows regression results.The dependent variable in all regressions is log(cash). 
Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. T-statistics, based on standard errors 
clustered by countries, in parentheses. 
Ɨ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.3. Main regressions for SME sample (max. 250 employees) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: All firms All firms All firms All firms Public 
insurance 
< median 
Public 
insurance 
≥ median 
Public insurance    -2.388*** -1.597*** -2.827*** 0.788 
   (-6.504) (-4.342) (-3.939) (1.296) 
Other country characteristics       
Legal labor protection     -0.352*   
    (-2.484)   
Union density    -0.011***   
    (-3.519)   
Private Credit  0.009** 0.008*** 0.005** 0.004* 0.001 
  (2.817) (4.672) (2.961) (2.050) (0.298) 
Rule of Law  0.630*** 0.481* 0.567*** 0.555*** 0.509*** 
  (3.621) (2.489) (4.615) (3.373) (7.136) 
Legal rights  -0.118 -0.210** -0.239*** -0.382*** 0.082 
  (-1.634) (-2.898) (-3.955) (-4.239) (1.445) 
GDP growth   0.049** 0.035*** 0.031** 0.013 0.032* 
  (3.221) (3.474) (3.169) (1.488) (2.027) 
Firm characteristics       
Ebit  2.856*** 2.865*** 2.823*** 2.841*** 2.514*** 3.181*** 
 (13.819) (15.099) (13.823) (13.485) (11.108) (12.239) 
Volatility 0.858* 1.058*** 1.099*** 1.145*** 1.250*** 1.074*** 
 (2.169) (6.917) (7.065) (7.216) (5.085) (8.305) 
Log(size) -0.513*** -0.510*** -0.510*** -0.507*** -0.433*** -0.563*** 
 (-10.489) (-11.654) (-11.093) (-11.495) (-11.401) (-21.330) 
Log(age) 0.467** 0.412*** 0.284*** 0.270*** 0.228*** 0.308*** 
 (2.884) (7.752) (7.279) (6.974) (4.902) (9.405) 
Sales growth 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.003 -0.013 0.016*** 
 (0.538) (1.294) (0.509) (0.356) (-1.317) (4.954) 
Leverage 0.197 -0.259 -0.459* -0.482* -0.195 -0.780** 
 (0.555) (-1.019) (-2.077) (-2.172) (-1.243) (-2.699) 
Net working capital -0.938*** -0.899*** -0.791*** -0.789*** -0.623*** -0.933*** 
 (-6.586) (-6.609) (-5.132) (-4.949) (-13.464) (-5.376) 
Intangibility -0.590 -0.341 -0.059 -0.211 0.207 -0.263 
 (-1.124) (-1.234) (-0.270) (-1.059) (0.865) (-1.166) 
Tax rate -0.148* -0.084+ -0.085+ -0.079+ 0.048* -0.100*** 
 (-2.033) (-1.810) (-1.926) (-1.788) (2.484) (-4.480) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 933,645 933,645 933,645 920,280 421,774 511,871 
R2 0.191 0.267 0.299 0.305 0.298 0.245 
Note. This table shows regression results. The dependent variable in all regressions is log(cash). All reported results 
are based on random effects regressions. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. T-statistics, 
based on standard errors clustered by countries, in parentheses. 
+ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A.4. Firm risk and the effect of public insurance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample: Volatility < 
sample median 
Volatility ≥ 
sample median 
All firms 
Public insurance  -2.388*** -1.635*** -2.205*** 
 (-5.963) (-4.449) (-5.342) 
Public insurance x volatility   1.959* 
   (1.997) 
Other country characteristics    
Private Credit 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (4.140) (4.255) (3.885) 
Rule of Law 0.644** 0.534*** 0.633*** 
 (3.031) (3.950) (3.819) 
Legal rights -0.231** -0.178*** -0.191** 
 (-2.622) (-3.420) (-2.971) 
GDP growth  0.039*** 0.024* 0.031** 
 (3.702) (2.494) (3.086) 
Firm characteristics    
Ebit  5.171*** 2.560*** 2.768*** 
 (11.559) (18.282) (18.802) 
Volatility 7.332*** 0.185 0.178 
 (6.018) (1.416) (0.420) 
Log(size) -0.342*** -0.500*** -0.444*** 
 (-9.323) (-15.569) (-12.105) 
Log(age) 0.166* 0.266*** 0.222*** 
 (2.185) (4.270) (3.503) 
Sales growth 0.024*** -0.009 0.002 
 (3.376) (-1.167) (0.202) 
Leverage -0.233 -0.396* -0.365* 
 (-1.298) (-2.476) (-2.169) 
Net working capital -0.980*** -0.811*** -0.874*** 
 (-7.334) (-7.475) (-7.239) 
Intangibility -0.220 0.000 -0.047 
 (-1.110) (0.002) (-0.282) 
Tax rate -0.032 -0.009 -0.050 
 (-0.986) (-0.166) (-1.084) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 839,951 839,956 1,679,907 
R2 0.227 0.283 0.282 
Note. This table shows regression results. The dependent variable in all regressions 
is log(cash). All reported results are based on random effects regressions. Variable 
definitions and data sources are reported in Table 1. T-statistics, based on standard 
errors clustered by countries, in parentheses. 
+ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A.5. Change analysis with log(cash) (unwinsorized) as dependent variable  
 
Sample: Public insurance < 
median 
Public insurance ≥ 
median 
All firms 
Leverage * public insurance   -1.263+ 
   (-1.904) 
Leverage  0.771*** 0.271 0.921*** 
 (4.271) (1.308) (4.260) 
Log(size) -1.262*** -1.462*** -1.365*** 
 (-10.916) (-50.103) (-17.259) 
Ebit 0.707*** 0.711** 0.705*** 
 (13.654) (5.017) (8.860) 
Net working capital -0.999*** -1.017*** -1.010*** 
 (-11.438) (-17.558) (-18.500) 
Log(size) -0.008+ -0.014* -0.012** 
 (-1.999) (-2.795) (-3.295) 
Sales growth 0.253*** 0.313*** 0.291*** 
 (7.082) (8.123) (9.836) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 473,958 699,912 1,173,870 
R2 0.140 0.099 0.109 
Note. All reported results are based on OLS  regressions. Variable definitions and data sources are 
reported in Table 1, with indicating a change in the variable. T-statistics, based on standard errors 
clustered by countries, in parentheses. 
+ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A.6. Change regressions for SME sample (max. 250 employees) 
 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Sample: Public insurance < 
median 
Public insurance ≥ 
median 
All firms 
Leverage * public insurance   -0.686** 
   (-3.002) 
Leverage  0.549*** 0.261*** 0.648*** 
 (11.683) (24.463) (9.346) 
Log(size) -0.800*** -0.606*** -0.691*** 
 (-8.888) (-127.632) (-10.168) 
Ebit 0.490*** 0.351*** 0.418*** 
 (6.848) (37.428) (7.139) 
Net working capital -0.628*** -0.259*** -0.380*** 
 (-13.702) (-36.347) (-4.144) 
Log(size) -0.003 -0.004*** -0.004 
 (-0.638) (-4.388) (-1.523) 
Sales growth 0.114** 0.121*** 0.125*** 
 (3.777) (47.729) (8.764) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 271,612 391,970 663,582 
R2 0.117 0.049 0.075 
Note. This table shows regression results. The dependent variable in all regressions is Cash. All 
reported results are based on OLS  regressions. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in 
Table 1, with indicating a change in the variable. T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered by 
countries, in parentheses. 
 Ɨ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
